




Since January 30, 2005, when eight million Iraqi men and women went
to the polls, nation-building has been a phrase on many lips. For some, it is a
question; for others, an answer. For Iraqis, it is a job. Not only a phrase
susceptible of many definitions, however, nation-building also connotes an
aspiration that has several facets, each of which makes possible a different
vantage on problems and solutions. Each facet offers an independent lens, a
separate way of looking at the world.
This paper strives to shine light on and through those lenses. It works a
progressive mitosis, proceeding in three Sections. Each Section describes a
dichotomy in the nation-building aspiration. Section II distinguishes between
state-building, a concept that yields an institutional lens, and nation-building,
a concept that produces a nationalist lens. Section III then divides the concept
of nation-building into a republican perspective, which focuses on legal and
political participation, and a communitarian perspective, which focuses on
psychological and sociological participation. Finally, Section IV splits the
concept of legal and political participation into group and individual
participation. The goal of group participation yields a democratic lens, while
the goal of individual participation goal invites a human rights lens.
This Foreword, adverting to contemporary experience in Lebanon, Iraq,
and Afghanistan,' describes the many ways of looking at nation-building in
the Middle East and the broader Islamic world. It does not seek to answer the
questions that have arisen and are likely to arise as Iraqis and others strive to
realize the nation-building aspiration. Rather, it suggests that the answers and,
in turn, the immediate goals of the nation-building process, depend on the way
one examines the questions. Each author who has contributed to this
Symposium looks at nation-building through one or more lenses. But none
articulates a theory ordering them in importance or describing the priorities of
nation-building in any detail. This Foreword aims to illuminate the importance
of developing such a hierarchy.
1. I choose these three countries not only because each is in transition from one form of
government to another, but also because each is in particular need of nation-building. Sectarian strife has
wracked each of these three heterogeneous countries, and none has a strong institutional backbone.
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II.
Nation-building requires the creation of both a state and a nation. A state
is a territorial entity that provides certain services and public goods (usually
including security); a nation is a legal and sociological idea to which those
who live within the territory of a state may or may not subscribe. State and
nation are intertwined. For instance, the state may provide freedoms of speech
and assembly, and the participation those freedoms provoke, when full and
robust, may conduce to national legitimacy. Yet the distinction between state-
building and nation-building, at least in the Middle East, is more than an
exercise in semantics. Each concept offers a distinct lens, a distinct
epistemology.
Max Weber defined the state as that organ capable of monopolizing the
use of force within certain boundaries. 2 However, the night watchman state
would not and does not satisfy most modem citizens. As Michael Walzer has
put it, "every political community must attend to the needs of its members as
they collectively understand those needs." 3 The list of needs is usually long,
doubly so in the Middle East. Indeed, most Middle Eastern states are welfare
states, offering services that the United States does not. For instance, the
Transitional Administrative Law of Iraq proclaims the right of each citizen to
receive services from the state, declaring that "[t]he individual has the right to
security, education, health care, and social security." 4 State-building,
therefore, requires a focus on institutions, and the state-building concept is
best seen through an institutional lens.
In the Middle East, those in a position to offer protection, a key state
service, are often sub-state actors, including but not limited to religious
groups, civil society organizations, and tribal affiliates. In Iraq under
occupation, for instance, denominational and tribal groups have been more
effective than state police or coalition forces at providing security.5 Moreover,
those same sub-state actors are purveyors of other state services of a more
clearly discernible social character. In areas as disparate as Turkey and the
Palestinian Territories, it has been religious groups that have brought food to
the hungry and have healed the sick.6 Nor should this observation come as a
2. See generally MAX WEBER, THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 156
(Talcott Parsons ed., 1947).
3. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 84 (1983). But cf. ROBERT NoZiCK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (advocating "the minimal state" and arguing that distributive justice requires
no more).
4. TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW [Constitution] art. 14 (Iraq), available at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/govenmnent/TAL.html (Mar. 8, 2004). Although the Transitional
Administrative Law was drafted under U.S. supervision, the welfare provision is distinctively Iraqi. Cf.
Annex to the Administrative Law of Iraq in the Transitional Period, sec. I (noting that the Interim
Government had resolved to "administer Iraq's affairs ... by providing for the welfare and security of
the Iraqi people, promoting reconstruction and economic development"), available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/government/TALAnnex.html.
5. NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION BUILDING 78
(2004) (stating that the most "reliable as guarantors of... security [are] associations forming around
denominational identity").
6. Cf. Soli Ozel, Islam Takes a Democratic Turn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at A27
(describing the victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey as a triumph "for the angry,
downtrodden, impoverished and excluded masses"); Int'l Crisis Group, Islamic Social Welfare Activism
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Legitimate Target?, Middle East Report No. 13, at ii,
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surprise. In Europe, those same groups are often responsible for realizing
welfare mandates: in England, the local parish distributes food and offers
public services; 7 in Germany, the federal government relies on church
hospitals and schools.
8
In the Middle East, moreover, not only are sub-state actors often the
institutional source of state services, but it is also they who first sparked and
announced the demand for those services. The impetus for the creation of
Middle Eastern welfare states came, at least in large part, from Islam. Islamic
law, with its requirement of charitable zakat (tithe) inspired the notion that the
state should look after its citizens. 9 Moreover, Islamic constitutionalism has
been a source of procedural inspiration. Medieval secular law in the Middle
East was subject to few procedural limits. Magistrates, who applied the
secular law (qanun), were able to rely on intimidation and hearsay. Procedure
was a matter of religious law. It has been by importing the procedures of
religious law that modem Middle Eastern welfare states have been able to
function. 10 Finally, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, by
reaching out to the dispossessed long before the state did, entrenched the
welfare ideal.1
State-building in the Middle East, ironically enough, may function best
at the sub-state level. While sub-state actors are the institutions required for
state-building, the nation-building project in the Middle East must be
coextensive with the territory controlled by the state.
In the words of Benedict Anderson, a nation is an "imagined
community.12 One need look no farther than to contemporary Lebanon to see
the perils of building that community at a sub-state level. Kamal Salibi was
not joking when he described Lebanon as a "House of Many Mansions.
13
The country has nationalisms within nationalisms, and the territory controlled
by the state is divided into petty fiefdoms. For instance, when the Lebanese
parliament voted last fall to derogate from the Constitution and extend
Maronite Christian President Emile Lahoud's term by three years, three
ministers tied to the Druze politician Walid Jumblatt resigned in protest. The
Druze, who are shut out of the highest offices in the land by law, comprise a
http://www.crisisgroup.orgihome/index.cfm?id=3033&1=1 (Apr. 2, 2003) ("[S]uch institutions [religious
organizations in the Palestinian Territories] are more efficient than their ...official counterparts,
delivering aid without distinction as to religious belief or political affiliation.").
7. Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?, 49
MCGILL L.J. 635,647 (2004).
8. Gerhard Robbers, State and Church in Germany, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 57, 63 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1996) ("Without [religious] services, the guarantees of a social
State .... would be mere empty postulates.").
9. See, e.g., PATRICIA CRONE, GOD'S RULE: GOVERNMENT AND ISLAM 393 (2004) (citing Al-
Amiri for the proposition that "'[rleligions are never established for private benefit or individual
advantage but always aim at collective welfare").
10. For instance, the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 was one of the first to permit interpolation.
See OTTOMAN CONSTITUTION art. 38.
11. L. CARL BROWN, RELIGION AND STATE: THE MUSLIM APPROACH TO POLITICS 155 (2000)
(Sayyid Qutb once said, "[W]hen there are those who cannot even find rags to cover their bodies, it is an
impossible luxury that a mosque should cost a hundred thousand guineas.").
12. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991).
13. KAMAL SALIBI, A HOUSE OF MANY MANSIONS: THE HISTORY OF LEBANON RECONSIDERED
(1990).
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sub-state nation. As the tumultuous aftermath of the recent assassination of
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri has shown, too many nationalisms breed
violence. Nation-building, therefore, requires a focus on all those who live
within a state's territory, and the nation-building concept is best seen through
a nationalist lens.
The nation-building aspiration appears differently through these two
lenses; whether it is to be an institutionalist or a nationalist endeavor makes a
difference. Take, for instance, the choice of electoral system. A new
democracy could adopt either majoritarianism, where the winner takes all, or a
proportional system, where seats are divvied up according to share of the
vote. 14 There are wrinkles to each system-including, for instance, the
Alternative Vote, which is a kind of modified majoritarianism-but
majoritarianism encourages a strong central government, while a proportional
system encourages the proliferation of small parties.
Iraq has chosen strict proportional representation. As expected, this
choice has proven a boon to small parties-a party needed only roughly 1/275
of the national vote in the January 2005 election to get a seat at the table. This
choice reflects an unspoken emphasis on state-building at the possible expense
of nation-building. Indeed, as of this writing, the Iraqi National Assembly had
yet to agree on a presidency council, much less on a prime minister or a
cabinet. Yet each party elected to the National Assembly has been able to
bring electoral dividends to its constituents. 15 Those who designed the Iraqi
electoral system were looking through the institutional lens. Their priority was
to ensure that water ran and that streets remained as violence-free as possible.
III.
The nation-building concept-the project of creating an imagined
community-is also susceptible of division. Citizenship in a nation, as Peter
Schuck has intimated, has at least two distinct component concepts: legal and
political participation, and psychological and sociological participation. 16
Encouraging the former requires a focus on formal mechanisms such as
voting. Encouraging the latter, by contrast, requires a focus on emotive
mechanisms such as pledging allegiance. Whereas legal and political
participation require a republican point of view, the psychological and
sociological facets of citizenship are best seen through a communitarian
lens.
17
Legal and political participation are essential to the creation of a nation.
They represent a commitment to common goals and to the common good.
Only when citizens are committed to a polity can that polity be termed a
14. For a description of electoral systems, see Donald L. Horowitz, Electoral Systems: A
Primer for Decision Makers, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2003, at 115.
15. Cf. Edward Wong, Kurds' Return to City Shakes Politics in Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 14,
2005, at Al (discussing how the success of Kurdish candidates in the January election facilitated the
Kurdish return to the city of Kirkuk).
16. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 207-08
(2000) (describing the political, legal, psychological, and sociological dimensions of citizenship).
17. I borrow these terms from Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 237 (1994).
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nation. Yet inducing such participation in territories in transition, such as Iraq,
can be tricky. The Sunnis, for instance, were no-shows during the recent Iraqi
elections. The task of wooing the Kurds has proven a tall one. When a new
nation is to incorporate several sub-state groups, each with a strong sense of
its own unique identity, it may prove hard to induce participation in the
national political process.
In general, the solution to this kind of problem is federalism. In a federal
system, individuals hold two citizenships---one local and one coextensive with
the territory controlled by the state that aspires to nationhood. In part, this is a
sop to disaffected minority groups, such as the Quebecois in Canada, a
necessary part of the bargain pursuant to which they will show up to vote in
national elections. Yet from the republican perspective, federalism also has
intrinsic worth. Encouraging the creation of local governments precludes
diseconomies of scale and fosters the kind of economic and political activity
conducive to participation.8 Moreover, competition among various bodies-
local and national-promotes responsiveness, which in turn leads inexorably
to greater participation. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor once put it,
federalism "increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes" and "makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.'
' 9
Federalism is a solution congenial to many sub-state groups in the
Middle East, and to Iraqis in particular. Kurds, for instance, not only desire it
but also are apt representatives for its first-order worth. On the first point, the
Kurds pressed the Iraqi Governing Council, during the drafting of the
Transitional Administrative Law, to permit any three provinces to veto
whatever permanent constitution might be proposed, enhancing provincial
power. On the second, although a byproduct of the disgraced United Nations
Oil for Food Program, the establishment of a Kurdish government for Iraq's
autonomous northern regions fostered precisely the kind of engagement and
participation to which federalism theoretically conduces.
Moreover, even the peculiar angle that Iraq is taking toward the adoption
of a federal system-moving from a centralized to a decentralized government
rather than vice-versa-has its precedents in the Middle East. During the
middle of the nineteenth century, after barely quashing a revolt led by
Muhammad Ali, a powerful governor of Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, once a
heavily centralized state, devolved power to its provinces and offered a reform
program, the tanzimat, that strengthened local government.
Since federalism encourages legal and political participation, the
republican lens often focuses on local government. Unlike the institutional
lens, the focus of the republican lens is not on groups or particular sub-state
actors; its focus is structural, not personal. But like the institutional lens, the
focus of the republican lens does not extend to a country's borders.
Yet psychological and sociological allegiances-concepts of emotional
being-can be formed only at the national level. As Stephen Legomsky has
18. See generally Jenna Bednar et al., A Political Theory of Federalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 223 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001).
19. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
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put it, citizenship is meaningful only if it "formalizles] an emotional
attachment to . . . [a country and] to its other citizens.",20 Dual citizenship,
whether given to another nation or to a local entity, makes this emotional
attachment harder to create. It is perhaps for this reason that the United States
requires those individuals naturalizing as U.S. citizens to renounce all other
loyalties.
Afghanistan offers a prime lesson in the deleterious effects of a failure to
inspire emotional attachment to the nation. The central government and the
international community have acquiesced as local leaders have carved out
vice-royalties-the North for the Uzbeks and the Panjshir for the Tajiks, for
instance. At the same time, there is little love for the central government of
President Hamid Karzai, who is perceived not to "say anything without
checking with [the United States] first. '' 21 Day by day, it seems, people
become more disaffected. Afghanistan cannot claim the psychological and
sociological allegiance of its people.
Indeed, it can be hard to evoke such allegiance in the Middle East even
in more established states. For instance, in Qatar, at least ostensibly, "[tlhe
people.., are a part of the Arab nation. 22 Such supra-territorial nationalisms
make territorial nationalism hard to generate and redouble its importance. The
communitarian lens, like the nationalist lens, must therefore focus precisely on
the territory controlled by the state.
The republican and communitarian lenses offer different perspectives. A
republican point of view might evoke an endorsement of a prominent role for
Islam and shariah. As Abdulaziz Al-Fahad has demonstrated, shariah can act
as a constraint on a government susceptible to few limitations.23 Indeed, from
the earliest times, Muslim thinkers have seen religion as a check on the power
of the caliph or ruler. Neo-Platonist philosophers such as al-Farabi urged that
"if it does not happen that a man exists with [the appropriate] qualifications,..
[one should] adopt the Laws prescribed by the earlier [Kings]. 24 Others,
such as Ibn Khaldun, subscribed to similar, if more contractarian and less
immanent, views. As Ibn Khaldun said, "[w]hen the Muslims got their
religion from the Lawgiver (Muhammad), the restraining influence came from
themselves." 25 Since Islam and the shariah can limit the power of the central
government to the advantage of local governments, they may be republican
goods.
Looking through the communitarian lens, on the other hand, might
evoke an endorsement of a constitutional resolution of such pressing national
questions as the control of a territory's natural resources. The Transitional
Administrative Law of Iraq declares that oil "belongs to all the people of all
20. Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279, 291 (1994).
21. Yochi J. Dreazen & David S. Cloud, Another Big Handover Looms for Iraq, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 23, 2005, at A4.
22. QATAR CONST. art. 1.
23. Abdulaziz H. Al-Fahad, Ornamental Constitutionalism: The Saudi Basic Law of
Governance, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 375 (2005).
24. Alfarabi, The Political Regime (Fauzi M. Najjar trans.), in MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: A SOURCEBOOK 31, 37 (Ralph Lemer ed., 1972).
25. IBN KHALDUN, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY 96 (N.J. Dawood &
Franz Rosenthal trans., 1967).
Symposium: Nation-Building in the Middle East
the regions and governorates of Iraq. ''26 If an Iraqi central government is to be
strong, it must be able to enforce parity among provinces and control oil for
the benefit of the entire Iraqi populace.
IV.
Even the legal and political component of the nation-building concept
may be divided. Participation requires two senses of self. As George Herbert
Mead has affirmed, "one has to be a member of a community to be a 
self.",2 7
Yet, respect for certain rights that inhere in our common humanity is also a
prerequisite to selfhood. Fostering the first sense of self requires a focus on
groups, whereas encouraging the second sense of self requires a focus on
individual human rights. Privileging the first sense of self favors participation
regardless of its costs; privileging the second sense of self elevates the
preconditions to democracy over democratic participation. The first sense of
self is thus best seen through a democratic lens, the second sense of self
through a human rights lens.
It is beyond cavil that political choices and legal actions are meaningful
only when made or rendered against a rich backdrop of intersubjective norms.
In the Middle East, when groups have been strong, citizens have participated
in political processes. In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Lebanon,
for instance, during the Arab Awakening, the nahda, political activity
flourished.28 Reformers wrote political tracts, met as secret literary societies,
and led revolutions.
Ensuring the flourishing of such norm-creating communities today may
require affirmative action; rights may need to be given to groups qua groups.
Group rights could include rights afforded to religious groups-for instance, a
right to assistance from the state in collecting revenue (as in Germany), or a
right to funding for schools (as in The Netherlands)-or rights granted to a
burgeoning civil society-for instance, the kinds of commercial law reform
recommended by Ian Ayres and Jonathan Macey.
29
Group rights not only facilitate and encourage participation but also
foster an environment of tolerance, which in turn promotes group formation
and participation. Tolerance is engendered by competition-when there are
more groups, each has to make itself more appealing to draw or retain
constituents.
Indeed, this is precisely what happened in the United States. Liberal
laws permitted Catholics to establish themselves politically and socially
during the nineteenth century. Once established, they began to press for equal
treatment, and the once dominant Protestants responded by reforming and
26. TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, art. 25(E).
27. GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY 162 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1962).
28. See generally ALBERT HOURANI, ARABIC THOUGHT IN THE LIBERAL AGE (1983); HISHAM
SHARABI, ARAB INTELLECTUALS AND THE WEST: THE FORMATIVE YEARS (1970); BASSAM TIBI, ARAB
NATIONALISM: BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE NATION-STATE (1997).
29. Ian Ayres & Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional and Evolutionary Failure and Economic
Development in the Middle East, 30 YALE. J. INT'L. L. 397 (2005). Indeed, as Robert Putnam has
demonstrated, commercial activity can lead to the creation of trusting and vibrant communities. ROBERT
D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 167-71 (1993).
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pressing back. As United States Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas is
notoriously said to have remarked to fellow Justice Hugo Black, "if the
Catholics get public money to finance their religious schools, we better insist
on getting some good prayers in public schools or we Protestants are out of
business." 30 This competition between Catholics and Protestants inspired a
move toward non-denominationalism in schools and public life around the
United States.3 1
Iraq has already begun to take steps to protect groups. The Transitional
Administrative Law enshrines religious freedom and states that "[n]either the
Iraqi Transitional Government nor the governments and administrations of the
regions .. .may interfere with the right of the Iraqi people to develop the
institutions of civil society." 32 Yet norm-creating communities may stifle the
voices of some of their members. To take an egregious example, in parts of
Afghanistan it was impossible for women to vote in the recent presidential
election. 33 Under the Pashtunwali, the tribal code of some Afghans and
Pakistanis, when one group needs to make restitution to another, it supplies
the aggrieved side with virgin women.34 As Swanee Hunt and Isobel Coleman
worried in a recent op-ed, female legal and political participation in Iraq is
unlikely if the plight of women there comes to mirror that of women in
neighboring Iran.
35
The democratic lens and the liberal lens are not as distinct from one
another as are the republican and communitarian lenses. Although there is
some intuitive appeal to the notion that empowering religious groups might
lead to illiberal suppression of the human rights of their members, recent
empirical work suggests that "[o]ne of the main reasons for the [detrimental]
change in treatment of women in modem Shari'ah courts" was the
replacement of flexible traditional methodology "by particular laws suitable to
nineteenth-century Nation-State patriarchal hegemony. ' 36 Moreover, it would
be not only orientalist but also unjust to presume that there is a single,
universal, undifferentiated content to the term liberalism.
Yet the democratic lens and the liberal lens should be distinguished, for
they inspire different actions. For instance, one of the important questions that
will come before the new Iraqi government will be how deeply to entrench
any constitutional solution reached. The U.S. Constitution is notoriously hard
to amend; others, such as the Hungarian or the Polish Constitutions, can be
30. Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the
Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 234 (2003).
31. Cf Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 121 (2001); Noah Feldman, Non-sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J. L. &POL. 65 (2002); John C.
Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279
(2001).
32. TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, art. 21.
33. Cf. David Rohde, 14 Afghans Are Killed for Registering to Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28,
2004, at Al (describing Taliban efforts to intimidate women involved in election efforts).
34. Mark A. Drumbi, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the Women of
Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349,384-85 (2004).
35. Swanee Hunt & Isobel Coleman, Women's Rights: Iran's Bitter Lessons for Iraq, INT'L
HERALD TRiB., Feb. 7, 2005, available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2005/-
020705 hunt iht.htrn (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
36. Amira Sonbol, Women in Shari'ah Courts: A Historical and Methodological Discussion,
27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 225,232-33 (2003).
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amended by simple legislation.37 Looking through the democratic lens might
inspire the promulgation of a constitution that is readily amendable, since such
a constitution reflects a more perfect form of popular sovereignty. Looking
through the human rights lens, however, might inspire the promulgation of an
unamendable constitution, since it is only now that all parties are at the table,
anxious to come to terms, no party is sure of its standing, and the international
community is watching closely. While the democratic lens focuses on
groups, 38 the human rights lens zooms in on individuals.
V. CONCLUSION
This Foreword suggests the complexity of most nation-building
heuristics. It has outlined six different lenses, each with a different focus. The
institutional lens focuses on sub-state groups, while the nationalist lens
focuses on the full territory of a state; the republican lens focuses on organs of
local government, while the communitarian lens focuses on the state; and the
democratic lens focuses on the group, while the liberal human rights lens
focuses on the individual.
Each of the authors who follow seems to be looking through one lens.
Abdulaziz AI-Fahad notes the power that popular, extra-constitutional protest
may have. He seems to be looking through the democratic lens. By contrast,
Ian Ayres and Jonathan Macey aspire to the creation of a robust civil society.
They seem to be looking through the republican lens. Finally, Ash Bali
suggests that the international community takes the moral high ground when it
facilitates state-building rather than nation-building. 39 This assertion reflects a
predilection for institutional development.
None of these authors, with the possible exception of Bali, explains the
reasons for choosing a particular lens. None answers questions such as:
"Should state-building come before nation-building?" or "Is voting more
important than pledging allegiance?" This failure to consider the diverse set of
approaches subsumed within the nation-building aspiration is reflected on the
ground today. The international community, Middle Eastern reformers, and
Iraqi politicians are all in need of a hierarchical set of priorities. This need
remains unfulfilled.
37. Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern
Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 275, 289 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
38. These groups are not necessarily the same as those responsible for the provision of state
services, although they may be.
39. Ash 10. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in
Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 431 (2005).
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